Agency, Experience, and Future Bias by Kauppinen, Antti
Agency, Experience, and Future Bias 
Antti Kauppinen 
University of Helsinki 
To appear in Thought 
 
In Reasons and Persons, Derek Parfit (1984) observed that most people are biased towards 
the future at least when it comes to pain and pleasure. That is, they regard a given amount of 
pain as less bad when it is in the past than when it is in the future, and a given amount of 
pleasure as less good. While Parfit (implicitly) held that this bias is rational, it has recently 
come under effective attack by temporal neutralists, who have offered cases that with 
plausible auxiliary assumptions appear to be counterexamples to the rationality claim. I’m 
going to argue that these cases and the rationale behind them only suffice to motivate a more 
limited rejection of future bias, and that constrained future bias is indeed rationally 
permissible. My argument turns on the distinct rational implications of action-guiding and 
pure temporal preferences. I’ll argue that future bias is rational when it comes to the latter, 
even if not the former. As I’ll say, Only Action Fixes Utility: it is only when you act on the 
basis of assigning a utility to an outcome that you rationally commit to giving it the same 
value when it is past as when it is in the future. 
 
1. Future Bias 
Let’s start with Parfit’s most famous case. I will borrow Tom Dougherty’s formulation of the 
setup: 
Parfit’s Operations 
On Monday, you are admitted into a hospital. You are told you will have one of two 
operations, but you are not told which. If you have the early operation, then you will 
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have a painful, four-hour operation on Tuesday. If you have the late operation, then 
you will have a painful, two-hour operation on Thursday. After either operation, you 
will have amnesia for several days, and so you will not be able to remember if you 
have just had the operation. There is a calendar next to your bed, and so you always 
know what day it is. (Dougherty 2011, 522; cf. Parfit 1984, 165) 
 
Now, suppose you wake up in a fog, and see that it is Wednesday. You don’t know whether 
you’ve had the operation or not. How would you feel if a nurse came by and told you that you 
had the more painful operation on Tuesday? Most people, Parfit’s critics included, admit they 
would be relieved. But if so, they prefer a greater pain in the past to a smaller pain in the 
future. This means, on standard decision-theoretical assumptions, that they assign a lower 
disutility to the same amount of pain in the past than in the future. They are future-biased. 
Notice that future bias entails preference reversals as one moves forward in time. On 
Monday, when both operations are in the future, you’d prefer to have the operation on 
Thursday rather than Tuesday, while on Wednesday, you have the opposite preference. 
(However, and this will be crucial to my argument, in Parfit’s original case you don’t get to 
choose.)  
While most people are future biased, the question is whether such bias is rational. 
Recently, this assumption has been challenged by several critics who hold that other things 
being equal, we should be neutral between the past and the present, just as we should be 
neutral between near future and far future.  
 
2. Against Future Bias 
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I’m going to start presenting the case against the rationality of future bias by introducing a 
few counterexamples from the literature. Some objections draw on the notion of regret, 
understood thinly as preference that one would have chosen differently.   
As Preston Greene and Meghan Sullivan emphasize, anticipating regret can influence 
rational choice. According to a plausible principle they call Weak No Regrets, it is rationally 
permissible for agents to avoid options they know they will regret, if they have full and 
accurate information about their options (Greene and Sullivan 2015, 958). This creates a 
problem for a future-biased agent in a case like the following: 
Fine Dining 
Jack wins a free meal at a fancy French restaurant on Monday morning, and he must 
schedule the meal for a night sometime in the next week. Given his flexible schedule, 
every night is equally convenient for him, and there are no other considerations that 
would make the meal more enjoyable or more likely to occur on one night rather 
than another. Therefore, Jack schedules the meal for Monday night. As expected, it is 
an incredibly delicious meal. On Tuesday morning, Jack strongly prefers that his 
restaurant experience were in the future, rather than the past. And so he regrets 
scheduling the meal for the previous night. (Greene and Sullivan 2015, 959) 
 
Insofar as Jack is future-biased, he knows he will regret choosing the meal for any but the last 
night, so in accordance with Weak No Regrets, it’s rational for him to postpone it as far as he 
can. If there is no fixed endpoint (if he can have the fancy meal any day he wants), it is 
rational for him to just keep waiting. But this is a terrible idea; as Greene and Sullivan put it, 
“future-biased agents who avoid regret will postpone positive experiences for no good 
reason” (2015, 959–960). So to be rational, Jack needs to give up his future bias. 
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 Future bias will also lead to irrational-seeming regret when agents make trade-offs 
between goods that depreciate with the passage of time and goods that don’t, which results in 
a diachronically inconsistent exchange rate. To quickly sum up a case from Dougherty 
(2015), suppose Victoria thinks on Saturday morning that the value of having a mown lawn is 
5 utils and the value of a pleasant afternoon spent sunbathing with no garden work is 6 utils. 
However, if future-biased, she will in the evening regard her past pleasure as being worth 
less, say 4 utils, and consequently regret she didn’t mow the lawn. Victoria’s regret seems 
irrational. After all, she always knew how much she values an orderly lawn, but still chose the 
sunbathing, which was just as nice as expected. As Dougherty puts it, “If the pleasure of 
sunbathing is insufficient to justify foregoing gardening, then she should not choose 
sunbathing in the first place.” (2015, 8) 
As Dougherty observes, sometimes our choice of what to do depends more directly 
on how we evaluate what has happened. Here is one case based on his 2015 paper:  
 Volunteer Tom 
Tom thinks we should spend some time doing unpleasant things that help others. 
This week, he figures he’ll have done his bit if he gives up five utils for others. 
Looking ahead, he thinks each hour spent volunteering at the soup kitchen costs him 
one util, so he decides to spend five hours there on Saturday. It’s just as unpleasant 
as he thinks. But Tom is future-biased, and regards five hours of past pain as having 
the same disutility as one hour of future pain. Consequently, when he’s about to 
finish his shift, he realizes that he’s after all only suffered one util for others, so his 
duty calls him to stay another four hours. The next four hours are as unpleasant as he 
thought, but once they’re in the past, he finds that his additional sacrifice amounts to 
only 4/5 utils, so he’ll have to stay yet longer… This sad story keeps repeating itself.  
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Here Tom’s future bias catches him in a Zeno-like situation. Prospectively, he takes the 
disvalue of five unpleasant hours of volunteering to equal the sacrifice he should make, but 
retrospectively it will not suffice, so he ends up doing more and more. This pattern seems 
irrational. 
What, then, is the alternative to future bias that avoids the counterintuitive 
consequences? The critics hold that it is the following: 
 Temporal Neutrality 
The location of goods and harms within a life has no rational significance except 
insofar as it contributes to the value of that life. (Cf. Brink 2011) In particular, 
rationality requires you to regard the same amount of pain as just as bad for you 
whether it occurs in the past, present, or future, and pleasure equally good.  
 
An agent who has the pattern of valuing required by Temporal Neutrality will not discount 
past pains or pleasures, so they won’t regret their choices in scenarios like the above or end up 
like Tom.  
Temporal Neutralists offer various general rationales for their view. The core idea is 
that we’re temporally extended agents, and must rationally value what happens to us at 
different times in a consistent way (Brink 2011). Otherwise we will forego pleasure or suffer 
pain without being in any way compensated for it, in spite of full information and rationality, 
and may even be brought to make tradeoffs that make us worse off without benefiting us in 
any way (Dougherty 2011). To avoid such an undesirable situation, we need an overall life-
plan that we can endorse at all times (Dougherty 2015).  
 Finally, Temporal Neutralists offer debunking explanations of why we’re future-
biased. Greene and Sullivan, in particular, argue that future bias is an evolved heuristic: 
“future-biased emotions and preferences evolved to track asymmetries in control” (2015, 
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968). The idea is simple: we care more about future pleasures and pains, because we can often 
do something about them, while we can’t do anything about past pleasures and pains. It is 
clearly advantageous to focus on what we can control. Nevertheless, according to critics, this 
bias can systematically lead us astray in circumstances in which our attitudes or actions hang 
on our evaluations of what has already happened. 
 
3. Only Action Fixes Utility 
I’m fairly convinced by the counterexamples that the critics present (though as Dorsey 2017 
shows, the intuitions are less firm than they may seem). I’ll grant that unrestricted future bias 
isn’t rational. Nevertheless, I’m not convinced by Temporal Neutralism. In the rest of this 
paper, I’m going to argue that the cases only motivate a more narrow rejection of future bias. 
In particular, I’m going to defend the following principle of diachronic rationality:  
Only Action Fixes Utility 
If you act on the basis of assigning utility u to state of affairs S, rationality requires 
you to assign u to S whenever it is relevant to action or attitude, unless you gain new 
information about S.1 However, if you do not act on the basis of assigning u to S (nor 
have acted or ever will), it is rationally permissible to assign a different utility u’ to S 
at different times without gaining new information about S, at least when the 
underlying preferences are hedonic. 
 
As I’m using the terms, the utility of a state for an agent is a value that is derived from the 
agent’s preferences between possibilities, provided that they meet constraints like 
completeness and transitivity. I’ll say an agent assigns a utility to S when she has preferences 
with the right structure between possibilities that include S. A change in S-regarding 
                                                
1 We might also add the condition that one doesn’t discover that one’s earlier preferences 
were mistaken or corrupted. I’ll ignore this complication in what follows. 
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preferences thus entails a change in the utility assigned to S. An agent acts on the basis of 
assigning a certain utility to S if and only if her S-regarding preferences explain, at least in 
part, her choice between acts whose outcomes include S.2 Finally, by preference I mean an 
attitude of favouring one state over another that may be manifest both in dispositions to 
choose and in emotions and attitudes like regretting, hoping, and wishing.3 
It follows from the principle that if at t1 you prefer A to B at t, and act on that basis, 
then at any later t2, you rationally must still prefer A to B at t in the context of action, unless 
you’ve learned something new about A or B at t. However, if you don’t act on a preference, 
you’re rationally permitted to change it as time goes by. I’ll call the latter kind of bias pure 
future bias. 
Only Action Fixes Utility has the right implications for the above scenarios. Greene 
and Sullivan’s Jack’s problem is that he’ll regret eating the fancy meal on any night other 
than the last possible night, since while a meal on any night is prospectively equal, a meal on 
any but the last is retrospectively downgraded. But if Only Action Fixes Utility is true and 
Jack chooses to dine on Monday on the basis of assigning 10u to the pleasure of doing so, 
he’s rationally committed to assigning the same value to it subsequently. Insofar as he does 
so, he won’t regret it, since on Tuesday he remains indifferent between having had the meal 
and having it that night or later. And this means that even if Weak No Regrets is true, it is not 
rational for Jack to postpone positive experiences just because of temporal location. Similarly, 
                                                
2 A radical holist might challenge the present view by claiming that we always act on the basis 
of all of our preferences, so that it is not possible to isolate non-action-guiding utility-
assignments. But as a very helpful reviewer for this journal pointed out, focusing on 
preferences that explain a choice offers a response to this challenge: not even the radical 
holist can credibly claim that all preferences play an explanatory role of this sort in each 
choice.  
3 As a reviewer for this journal observed, some might want to distinguish between practical 
and emotional preferences, where the latter do not involve a disposition to act. These different 
kinds of preferences might then be subject to different rational requirements. I believe that my 
thesis and arguments could be formulated in these terms as well, but given that the critics of 
future bias treat preferences as forming a unified kind (e.g. Dougherty 2015, 2fn1), I will 
continue to do so myself. 
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Dougherty’s Victoria, having chosen to sunbathe on the basis of assigning it a higher utility 
than lawn-mowing, will never come to regret her choice, since she won’t vary the exchange 
rate. Finally, Tom, too, decides to do five hours of volunteering on the basis of prospectively 
considering it to be the right amount of sacrifice. His problem is that while it is just as hard as 
he expected, he retrospectively revises down its disvalue, which sets him on an Eleatic path. 
But again, if Only Action Fixes Utility and Tom is rational, he will continue to regard five 
hours of volunteering as having a sufficient amount of disutility, when it turns out as 
anticipated, and he’ll be satisfied that he’s fulfilled his duty after a good afternoon’s work. 
 Unsurprisingly, Only Action Fixes Utility yields the same verdict regarding the 
above cases as Temporal Neutrality. Unlike Temporal Neutrality, however, Only Action 
Fixes Utility is compatible with pure future bias. In particular, it permits preference change in 
Parfit’s Operations, because in it, the subject doesn’t have a choice, and thus isn’t rationally 
compelled to assign the same utility to past and future pain. So even if on Monday you prefer 
the Thursday operation, it’s rationally okay to prefer the more painful Tuesday one, come 
Wednesday, and thus be relieved if you discover the doctors did indeed perform the operation 
on Tuesday.  
The significance of Only Action Fixes Utility comes out clearly if we consider a 
variant of Parfit’s original case in which the subject does get to choose which operation to 
have: 
Chosen Operations 
On Monday, you are admitted into a hospital. You are told you will have one of two 
operations, and you get to choose which one. If you have the early operation, then 
you will have a painful, four-hour operation on Tuesday. If you have the late 
operation, then you will have a painful, two-hour operation on Thursday. After either 
operation, you will have amnesia for several days, and so you will not be able to 
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remember if you have just had the operation. There is a calendar next to your bed, 
and so you always know what day it is. 
 
If you’re rational, you’ll choose the Thursday operation on Monday. Now suppose you again 
wake up in a fog in a hospital bed, not knowing what has happened, and notice that it is 
Wednesday. First question: do you regret having chosen the operation on Thursday rather 
than Tuesday? Second question: should you? Speaking for myself, I think I might feel a 
twinge of disappointment, and wish it was Friday already. But on the whole, I think I’d be 
fine with my choice, and certainly wouldn’t reproach my past self for having made it. I would 
not wish I had chosen otherwise, and thus wouldn’t regret my choice in the technical sense 
used in this debate. I’d say to myself “Well, it’s too bad it’s not over and done with, but 
there’s just one more day to the less painful option I chose.” If that’s how I think, I own my 
choice, as we might say. And I think that’s the rational attitude to take here.  
To further confirm the principle’s fit with considered judgments about cases, imagine 
the following scenario: 
Mistaken Operations 
Your situation is the same as in Chosen Operations, and you choose the Thursday 
operation. As you wake up in a fog, you see that it is Wednesday. A nurse brings you 
a tub of ice cream, asking you if you feel okay. Baffled, you learn that due to a 
clerical error, the operation has already been performed after all. 
 
In Mistaken Operations, you made a choice, but it turned out to be irrelevant to what actually 
happened – you might as well have not made a choice. If the outcome is out of your hands, I 
think it is both predictable and rationally permissible for you to feel relieved, though you 
might insist on a double-check the next time. Since switching from passive experience to 
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active agency (and back) switches intuitions, there’s good prima facie reason to think it is 
agency that plays an explanatory role when it comes to the impermissibility of future bias. 
   
4. Defending Pure Future Bias 
The obvious criticism of Only Action Fixes Utility is that it is ad hoc. Indeed, as long as there 
are diachronic norms of rationality, it is hard to see any other possible fault in it, since it 
captures both Parfit’s original intuition (which even his critics nearly always acknowledge to 
be strong) and the intuitions of his critics, and is in this respect clearly superior to Temporal 
Neutrality.4 For it not to be ad hoc, we need some further justification for it. Fortunately, there 
are several rationales available. 
First, let me emphasize again that the general rejection of future bias is not motivated 
by the counterexamples the critics have presented. They motivate precisely Only Action Fixes 
Utility, and no more. It is perhaps less obvious that the same is true of the rationales the 
critics give for temporal neutrality. But that turns out to be the case. Consider, first, the 
general claim made by Dougherty in his earlier paper: “The reason why an inconsistency in 
preferences is a rational defect is that this inconsistency will lead to problems when acting” 
(2011). If the preferences aren’t or can’t be acted upon, temporal inconsistency isn’t a 
problem on these grounds. In later work, too, Dougherty emphasizes temporally extended 
agency. The idea is that since our future selves are as much us as our present ones, we’re 
under rational pressure to make experience-affecting choices from a viewpoint that is equally 
satisfactory for our past, present, and future selves (Dougherty 2015, 7–8). And the only 
assignment of utility that is equally satisfactory from different temporal perspectives is one 
that is based only on intrinsic features, not relative temporal location. So Dougherty holds that 
                                                
4 There are those who deny the existence of diachronic norms of rationality, to be sure (see 
Hedden 2015). I’m skeptical of time-slice rationality for independent reasons, but cannot 
discuss the issue here. 
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“By conceiving of ourselves as temporally extended agents, we form temporally neutral 
preferences for goods that are based on how these goods contribute to how well our 
temporally extended lives go.” (2015, 14)  
While there is much that I agree with in this, the last formulation is revealing in that 
it involves a subtle but illegitimate generalization from the need for diachronic coordination 
and endorsement of actions to temporally neutral preferences for any kind of goods, not just 
those that our choices and actions affect. Here is a better motivated variant: by conceiving of 
ourselves as temporally extended agents, we form temporally neutral preferences for goods 
that are at stake in our actions that are based on how these goods contribute to how well our 
temporally extended lives go. And this is a rationale for Only Action Fixes Utility, not for 
Temporal Neutrality across the board.  
So as far as I can see, there is a good rationale or two for Only Action Fixes Utility 
that is independent of the intuitions about cases, and it is given by Temporal Neutralists 
themselves. But that’s not all. There is good reason to think that there is something special 
about how agency contributes to the value of our lives. Consider here again the fact that most 
people’s intuition with respect to shameful actions is temporally neutral, as Parfit already 
observed. You probably won’t prefer a world in which you did something shameful yesterday 
to one in which you’ll do something less shameful tomorrow, other things being equal. The 
same goes for actions that merit pride. I’m just as happy to think I have done something 
worthy of pride as to think I will do something worthy of pride, other things being equal. So it 
is not only the case that our intuitions are temporally neutral when it comes to active choices 
regarding pleasure and pain, but also when it comes to non-experiential goods or bads that 
result from exercising agency and can serve as grounds for choice. This again points to the 
importance of agency to temporal neutrality – which is captured in Only Action Fixes Utility. 
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The emphasis on agency also has the more controversial (and non-Parfitian) 
implication that it matters whose choices brought about an outcome. Someone objected to my 
view by pointing out that if I wake up on Wednesday and I’m told that my mother chose on 
my behalf to have the operation on Thursday, I can rationally wish she had chosen the 
Tuesday slot. But if it is then revealed that it was in fact myself who chose the Thursday 
operation, I can no longer rationally wish I’d already had the operation. The objection is that 
this is an odd pattern of emotional reaction. But I don’t think it is. It already makes a great 
deal of difference to us whether, say, we earn some money through our own work, or get the 
same amount from our mother. It’s not odd at all for us to own up to our choices – after all, if 
someone signs up for the army, fully knowing what to expect, a sergeant can rightly and 
effectively respond to complaints by saying “You didn’t have to sign up if you didn’t want to 
haul these missiles around”. If anything is odd about the case where my mother chooses the 
Thursday operation, it’s my wish that she had chosen otherwise. It is, of course, permissible 
according to Only Action Fixes Utility, but it’s not required. And when I recognize that 
someone made, on my behalf and in my best interests, the same choice I would myself have 
made, had I had the chance, it’s natural for me to retrospectively endorse it – to treat it as if it 
was my own choice. So it would be less surprising if I said to myself “It’s too bad it’s still 
ahead of me, but mama knows best, and I’m glad she chose the less painful operation for me”. 
Finally, I have argued elsewhere (Kauppinen 2015) that it is of fundamental 
significance to prudence that we have a dual nature as both temporally extended agents and as 
subjects of experience. While these two dimensions of prudential value can interact, as when 
we choose to act to gain or avoid an experience, they remain distinct. In particular, experience 
as such has an element of passivity: fundamentally, pleasures and pains happen to us. They 
are not under our voluntary control, as our actions may be. That is why our preferences 
regarding them are not subject to the same intertemporal consistency requirements, insofar as 
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they are untethered from actions. In such cases, nothing forces us to prefer a particular pattern 
of hedonic states. For example, rationality permits preferring a larger pleasure in the past to a 
smaller pleasure in the future. But most of us don’t have this preference, perhaps for the kind 
of evolutionary reasons that Greene and Sullivan point to. If I were to hazard a little 
psychological speculation, I’d say that perhaps anticipated future pains, say, de facto impact 
on our present preferences more than past ones, because our attention is ordinarily directed 
more towards the future rather than the past, and in some measure makes anticipated pains 
present right now, while past pains quickly vanish from the arena of presence. 
But isn’t preferring pain to be in the past still arbitrary, and therefore irrational? I see 
no reason to think so. It is rationally permissible to prefer chocolate ice cream to peppermint 
ice cream (or vice versa) because one simply happens to please you more. In such cases, there 
is no more fundamental reason for the preference, so it is in a sense ‘arbitrary’, but that 
doesn’t make it irrational. Pure future bias, or its absence, may be similar. You just happen to 
be pleased that a pleasure is to come or a pain is no longer. Since in the case of pure future 
bias there is no reason not to have such preference and no rationale for a rational prohibition, 
it is rationally permissible without further grounds. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Critics of future bias make a convincing case that if my preferences regarding pleasure and 
pain change with the mere passage of time, making choices on their basis can make me 
predictably worse off. As temporally extended agents, we should own up to our choices, and 
hold fixed our preferences between hedonic outcomes once we’ve acted on them. But not 
everything that happens to us is due to our own choice. That’s why there’s nothing wrong 
from the perspective of rationality if I’m relieved to discover that an unpleasant experience 
beyond my control is already in the past, even if I would have earlier preferred a less 
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unpleasant one in the future, or if my non-action-guiding wishes manifest a preference for a 
lesser pleasure in the future over a greater pleasure in the past. Given that Only Action Fixes 
Utility, pure future bias remains rationally permissible.5 
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